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Abstract 
 This article discusses the efficacy of the existing Regulation of 
Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998, and the proposed 
Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain 
Activities in the Country of Armed Conflict Act 27 of 2006, in 
regulating the private security industry and prosecuting those in 
contravention of the legislation. It discusses the motivations 
behind recent attempts to deny the citizenship of South African 
nationals who had taken up employment abroad in the private 
security industry. The article gives some guidance regarding the 
likelihood of prosecution for the new school of South African 
fighters taking up arms for foreign causes like ISIS, the IDF, and 
Nigeria. 
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1  Introduction 
This article is a sequel to one published in 2011 PER entitled "South African 
Private Security Contractors Active in Armed Conflicts: Citizenship, 
Prosecution and the Right to Work". In that article my co-author Marelie 
Maritz and I criticised the "aggressive overreaching legislation"1 and the 
broad powers vested in the National Conventional Arms Control Committee 
(NCACC) to grant or withhold authorisation to those working in the private 
military and security (PMS) industry. We concluded that the South African 
legislation seemed to be at odds with both the domestic legislation of other 
states and the existing international law obligations. We predicted that 
South African private security contractors (PSCs) would either continue to 
operate clandestinely or "denounce their citizenship in order to avoid 
prosecution".2 We cautioned that the Regulation of Foreign Military 
Assistance Act 15 of 1998 (FMA) and its proposed successor, the 
Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in the 
Country of Armed Conflict Act 27 of 2006 (PMA), would face legal 
challenges on constitutional, administrative and international law grounds.3 
Five years on it is now opportune to take stock of what has come of the 
post-apartheid government's choice to view South African PSCs and South 
African Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) that offer foreign 
military assistance abroad as mercenaries. I have also been prompted to 
revisit the conclusions that we drew in “South African Private Security 
Contractors Active in Armed Conflicts: Citizenship, Prosecution and the 
Right to Work" as a result of several incidents that have made news 
headlines over the last six years. 
In 2014 Runners for Palestine opened a case against a South African 
national, Dean Goodson, for serving in the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) in 
contravention of the FMA. In March 2015 reports emerged that familiar 
names in the PMS industry – like Eeben Barlow together with former 
members of "Executive Outcomes" – had re-surfaced in northern Nigeria, 
where together with another ex-South African PMSC (now based in Lagos), 
Pilgrims Africa Ltd they were assisting the Nigerian government to combat 
Boko Haram.4 In April 2015 a 15-year-old Cape Town girl who attempted to 
                                            
  Shannon Joy Bosch. BA (Hons) LLB (University of Natal) LLM (Cambridge) PhD 
(UKZN). Associate Professor in Law, Howard College School of Law, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal, Durban; Attorney of the High Court of South Africa. Email: 
Boschs@ukzn.ac.za. 
1  Bosch and Maritz 2011 PELJ 108. 
2  Bosch and Maritz 2011 PELJ 108. 
3  Bosch and Maritz 2011 PELJ 108. 
4  Fabricius 2015 http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/sadf-mercenaries-turning-tide-in-
SJ BOSCH  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  3 
board a flight, intent on joining Islamic State, was taken off the flight.5 
Several other South Africans have also reportedly already left to join ISIS. 
All of these incidents, while varied, have one aspect in common: all of these 
individuals operate without any NCACC authorisation.  
I will pick up where our last article left off and address these burning 
questions: Has the FMA been more successful in regulating the private 
security industry and prosecuting those in contravention of the legislation 
since 2011? Has the proposed PMA entered into force, and has it proven to 
be a more successful prosecutorial tool than the FMA? What has come of 
the attempts to deny the citizenship of South African nationals who had 
taken up employment abroad in the private security industry? And, lastly, 
what are we to make of the new school of South African fighters taking up 
arms for foreign causes like ISIS, the IDF, and Nigeria? Are they likely to 
face prosecution under the existing legislative regime?  
2  The prosecutorial success of the FMA and its impact on 
the private security industry  
Given South Africa's international reputation for being one of the most 
prolific exporters of PSCs, one would expect the NCACC to have been 
flooded with applications from South African citizens requesting 
authorisation to render foreign military assistance after the FMA entered into 
law. Instead, less than a handful of individual PSCs and South African-
based PMSCs have ever applied for the required NCACC authorisation.6 
Given this lack of adherence to the pre-authorisation requirements set out 
in the FMA, one would expect the NPA to have acted swiftly to prosecute 
                                            
nigeria-1843796; York 2015 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/nigeria-
hires-mercenaries-to-fight-boko-haram/article23442385/. A contractor to the 
Nigerian army confirms that they are being hired at US$400 per day: "It is the same 
group of people who fought in Sierra Leone, and in Angola … he puts their ages at 
between 50 and 65. They aren't as fast as they used to be but they are well trained 
and efficient in handling weapons. If you have that knowledge you don't lose it. The 
things that Boko Haram have done over the past four, five years are so appalling. 
For once these guys are fighting the right enemy. They are on the right side. It is an 
opportunity for redemption … adding that Nigeria is considering hiring more." (Wallis 
and Manson 2015 https://www.ft.com/content/4cda876e-d2e8-11e4-a792-
00144feab7de). 
5  Hartleb 2015 http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Cape-Town-teen-girl-
pulled-off-flight-was-trying-to-join-ISIS. 
6  Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 61; Gumedze 2012 
https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/the-need-for-an-international-code-of-conduct-
for-private-security-actors-in-africa. 
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the estimated 1.7 million-plus South African PSCs deployed abroad.7In 
reality, there have been very few instances of prosecution for contravention 
of the FMA – despite the fact that the FMA prohibits a wide range of 
activities, including the provision of equipment and "advice and training to 
other militaries".8 The NPA has not successfully prosecuted any South 
African nationals or organisations for offering these additional services,9 and 
appears to have restricted its prosecutions to only the high-profile instances 
of alleged mercenary activities.10  
As we detailed in “South African Private Security Contractors Active in 
Armed Conflicts: Citizenship, Prosecution and the Right to Work", almost 
without exception these cases have culminated in plea bargains and have 
resulted in the imposition of suspended jail terms and fines (ranging from 
R10 000 to R200 000).11 Given this abysmal prosecutorial track record, it 
comes as no surprise that Simon Mann and Nick du Toit could so easily 
recruit a small army of men for their doomed Wonga coup on South African 
soil,12 even after the FMA had entered into force. And when you consider 
that their recruits stood to earn between $1,500 (for foot soldiers) and 
$5,000 (for team leaders) per month,13 the threat of these insignificant fines 
was probably of little real deterrent effect.  
In February 2013 the NPA brought charges under the FMA against 20 
Congolese nationals14 for allegedly plotting to overthrow Joseph Kabila, the 
president of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and his government.15 
                                            
7  Gaston 2008 Harv Int'l LJ 241; Hodge 2006 http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2006/08/army_for_hire.html; Bosch, Maritz 
and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 61.  
8  This might include: "backpacks, spare parts for vehicles, tents" (Bosch, Maritz and 
Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 59); Avant Market for Force 162. 
9  Avant Market for Force 162. 
10  Messner "Working Towards Effective Legislative and Regulatory Solutions" 152; 
Jacobs 2008 Strateg Rev S Afr 11; Taljaard "Implementing South Africa's Regulation 
of Foreign Military Assistance Act" 175-176. 
11  Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 54. 
12  Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 54. In fact, in later 
years when Simon Mann recruited for his great "Wonga coup" failure, he initially 
claimed it was for a revived EO. Eben Barlow dismissed this misrepresentation, 
stating that the "Wonga coup took place several years after EO closed its doors" 
(Barlow "E-mail Response"- on file with author). 
13  Roberts The Wonga Coup 130. 
14  One of the accused (Etienne Kabila) claimed to be the "biological son of the slain 
Laurent Kabila, and that Joseph was an adopted child from a Rwandan family" 
(Potgieter and Patel 2013 http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-02-11-congo-
rebels-a-kabila-family-affair/#.WD0rlpN97fY; Bosch, Maritz and Kimble 
"Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 55). 
15  Anon 2013 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21432981; Taljaard 
"Implementing South Africa's Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act" 179; 
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Judge Billy Mothle presided over the case in the Pretoria High Court, and 
the initial list of 20 accused persons soon dropped to 5, owing to a lack of 
evidence.16 Counsel for the defence requested that Mothle J declare the 
FMA unconstitutional, describing its provisions as "unclear" and 
"ambiguous".17 In the end, all 5 men were acquitted when it came out during 
cross examination that the prosecution's case was heavily reliant on 
evidence which had been collected unlawfully in a trap set up by the Police's 
Anti-Terrorism unit – a division of the Hawks.18 The defendants were, at the 
conclusion of the trial, contemplating filing a civil suit against the State for 
their wrongful arrest and detention.19 In handing down his judgment, Judge 
Mothle20 expressed concerns about the overly expansive scope of the FMA, 
stating that it "was broad enough to also cover the legitimate activities of 
private military companies". This is the first indication from the judiciary that 
the plot to paint everyone employed in the PMS industry as mercenaries – 
through the application of the FMA – was going to face stiff challenges 
before the courts. 
While the FMA had failed to deliver the prosecutorial results that had been 
anticipated, this is not to say that the introduction of the FMA has not 
impacted negatively on the careers of South African PSCs. For some 
foreign PMSCs and militaries who had previously hired South Africans, the 
threat of reputational damage by association from the possible prosecution 
of South African contractors under the FMA made the once sought-after 
South African PSCs a liability. One UK-based PMSC, Erinys, retrenched 
100 South African security contractors, citing their need to avoid 
                                            
Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 55; Fabricius 2015 
http://www.iol.co.za/the-star/strange-chapter-in-sa-congo-saga-ends-1823026. 
16  SAPA 2014 http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/drc-coup-plot-trial-continues-
1733776. 
17  SAPA 2014 http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/drc-coup-plot-trial-continues-
1733776. In response, the state argued that the objective of the FMA was to ensure 
that "SA was not seen as a haven for mercenaries" (Bosch, Maritz and Kimble 
"Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 55; Makhubu 2015 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/five-drc-rebels-freed-1821749).  
18  SAPA 2014 http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/drc-coup-plot-trial-continues-
1733776; Makhubu 2015 http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/five-drc-rebels-
freed-1821749 
19  Makhubu 2015 http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/five-drc-rebels-freed-
1821749. 
20  SAPA 2014 http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/drc-coup-plot-trial-continues-
1733776; Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 55. 
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reputational damage "if the South African government chose to investigate 
and prosecute these individuals".21  
In short, despite the legislative zeal, individual South African PSCs have 
largely ignored the requirements of the FMA and have persisted in offering 
their services abroad. While some foreign companies (like Erinys) stopped 
hiring South Africa contractors the majority, however, seem to have 
continued doing "business as usual".  
3  Will the PMA have a better track record? 
At the time of writing “South African Private Security Contractors Active in 
Armed Conflicts: Citizenship, Prosecution and the Right to Work", the 
Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in 
Country of Armed Conflict Act 27 of 2006,22 which was drafted in 2006 and 
had attained the necessary presidential assent in November 2007, had 
already lingered for four years awaiting the necessary proclamation to make 
it law. Nine years on, the PMA has yet to receive the necessary presidential 
proclamation and regulations required to make it binding law.23  
Whether the PMA will be a more successful prosecutorial instrument than 
the FMA, when and if it ever enters into force, will be interesting to discover. 
In our earlier article we focused our discussion on the administrative-law 
hurdles which the PMA would likely face given the unfettered discretionary 
powers given to the NCACC.24 Given that the NCACC has had very few 
applications for authorisation to consider, it is perhaps more relevant to look 
more closely at the new provisions contained in the PMA, to assess whether 
it is ever likely to overcome the difficulties which continue to paralyse the 
FMA. 
As we had previously suggested, the provisions in the PMA were no less 
draconian then those of the FMA. However, there are two notable ways in 
which the PMA sought to enhance the chances of the NPA's successfully 
prosecuting those participating in the PMS industry without the required 
                                            
21  Jacobs 2008 Strateg Rev S Afr 11; Hodge 2006 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2006/08/army_for_hire.
html; Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 60. 
22  Security and Constitutional Affairs Select Committee 2006 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/7298/. 
23  Jeff Radebe confirmed that "the PMA is not yet in operation pending the finalisation 
of Regulations to this Act" (Radebe 2013 http://www.politicsweb.co.za/archive/2006-
prohibition-of-mercenary-activities-act-not-y; Gumedze Elimination of Mercenarism 
40). 
24  Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 57.  
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authorisation. The first pertains to the definition of the term "mercenary". It 
is evident from the records of the parliamentary working group's discussion 
minutes25 that they wanted to expand the application of the term 
"mercenary" to include:  
… other forms of involvement in the security sector that might only destabilise 
states, irrespective of whether the situation rose to the level of an armed 
conflict and even without an armed conflict being declared.26 
The definition also included within the Act's ambit "advice, logistical support, 
training, security services or personnel recruitment".27This expanded 
understanding of the scope of mercenary activities does not reflect the 
international community's understanding of the term "mercenary" – as set 
out in the UN Mercenary Convention.28  
Consequently, after some careful word-craft, a South African could face 
prosecution as a "mercenary" under the PMA for providing supportive or 
financial assistance in a conflict, where private gain was shown.29 
Hypothetically this means that the NPA would be able to bring a charge for 
"mercenary" activities under the PMA against South Africans who not only 
join the IDF or ISIS, but who financially support those fighting for IDF or ISIS 
– if their "private gain" can be demonstrated. Exactly how the NPA intends 
to show that those taking up arms and financially supporting ISIS or IDF are 
doing so for private gain remains to be seen, since in these two instances 
the motive for offering support is often cited as being ideological. The PMA 
could also be used to prosecute those PSCs who hold South African 
citizenship and who have reportedly been assisting the Nigerian 
government with advice and training in their pursuit of Boko Haram. More 
alarming is the possibility that any South African company selling anything 
from backpacks to tents to a foreign military, or any armed group, could find 
themselves in the dock as a result of the new parameters of the PMA. 
The PMA also augmented the prior jurisdictional scope of application of the 
FMA. Smarting from the difficulties faced in prosecuting those involved in 
the infamous "Wonga coup", those drafting the PMA increased the 
jurisdictional scope of the NPA's prosecutorial authority through the 
                                            
25  Security and Constitutional Affairs Select Committee 2006 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/7298/; Bosch, Maritz and Kimble 
"Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 53.  
26  Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 56. 
27  Franklin 2008 Transnat'l L & Contemp Probs 251. 
28  Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 56. 
29  Franklin 2008 Transnat'l L & Contemp Probs 251. This approach echoes the broad 
anti-terrorism legislation passed in the US and elsewhere. 
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inclusion of section 1130 – making it possible for the NPA to prosecute any 
criminal activity by a South African committed outside of South Africa.31 
Under the new scope of the proposed PMA, their mere involvement in the 
security sector and the potential that this might destabilise states is all that 
is required; it is no longer a pre-requisite that an armed conflict is declared.32 
This will mean that if or when the PMA enters into force, South Africans 
deployed abroad in the PMS industry without NCACC authorisation,33 even 
where they are employed by a PMSC that has no links to South Africa, and 
even at the invitation of the territorial state, will have to renounce their South 
African citizenship to avoid potential prosecution under section 11. The 
same is true for those 800 plus South Africans who currently serve in the 
British armed forces, all those who like Dean Goodson serve in the IDF,34 
and those South African nationals who have reportedly joined ISIS without 
the required NCACC authorisation.  
Whether the PMA will ever see the light of day remains to be seen, and one 
has to wonder why, after 9 years, it is still no closer to replacing the FMA. 
Whatever the official or underlying reason is, it is clear that the government's 
objective to restrict South African citizens from fighting for foreign causes is 
still very much on the agenda, and the proposed amendment to the South 
African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995 is testament to this. 
4  Denying citizenship when all else fails 
In “South African Private Security Contractors Active in Armed Conflicts: 
Citizenship, Prosecution and the Right to Work"  we noted with concern the 
true motive behind the amendment proposed in 2010 to section 6 of the 
                                            
30  Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 57.  
S 11 of the PMA: "Any act constituting an offence under this Act and that is 
committed outside the Republic by— 
a citizen of the Republic; 
a person ordinarily resident in the Republic; 
a company incorporated or registered as such under any law, in the Republic; or 
any body of persons, corporate or unincorporated, in the Republic 
must be regarded as having been committed in the Republic and the person who 
committed it may be tried in a court in the Republic which has jurisdiction in respect 
of that offence." 
31  Franklin 2008 Transnat'l L & Contemp Probs 253; Bosch, Maritz and Kimble 
"Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 65. 
32  Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 56. 
33  A person seeking such authorisation must submit an application to the NCACC, 
which considers the application and may either refuse it, grant the application subject 
to such conditions as it may determine, or at any time withdraw or amend an 
authorisation already granted (s 7(2) of the PMA).  
34  Franklin 2008 Transnat'l L & Contemp Probs 253. 
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South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995.35 In its initial form, the amendment 
would have permitted the government to revoke the South African 
citizenship of any South African found to be serving in a foreign military.36 
The real motive behind this proposal was allegedly to deter South African 
citizens from serving in the Israeli Defence Force,37 since the FMA was not 
proving an effective mechanism to deter or enforce its authorisation regime 
through the NCACC. At the time, the Director General of the Department of 
Home Affairs38 was certain that the proposed amendment was intended only 
to prevent naturalised South African citizens from retaining their South 
African citizenship if they were simultaneously serving in a foreign 
military.39Naturally, this sparked concerns about the potential for the 
proposed amendment to be used to deny citizenship to any South African 
citizen serving in a foreign military, and not just those who had obtained 
citizenship by naturalisation. As Kader Asmal40 astutely pointed out:  
We know how our government has not been able to implement the present 
anti-mercenary legislation because it has overreached itself. We wonder 
about the justification for the proposed amendments. 
To avoid the serious constitutional issues41 which this raised, section 6(3) 
was re-worked to avoid this implication, and it now reads: 
Section 6(3): Any person who obtained South African citizenship by 
naturalisation in terms of this Act shall cease to be a South African citizen if 
he or she engages, under the flag of another country, in a war that the 
Republic does not support.  
In the end this potential backdoor means at attempting to enforce the 
objectives of the FMA was also found wanting. In short, South African 
                                            
35  South Africa Citizenship Amendment Act 17 of 2010. The South Africa Citizenship 
Amendment Act will add subsection (c) to the already existing s 6 of the South Africa 
Citizenship Act 88 of 1995. 
36  defenceWeb 2010 http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content 
&view=article&id=9204:SouthAfrica-to-strip-soldiers-abroad-of-citizenship&catid 
=54:Governance&Itemid=118; Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate 
Actors" 58. 
37  Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 58. 
38  Mkuslei Alpeni. 
39  This Bill would, however, not have any effect on South African PSCs who are not 
serving in a foreign military. Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate 
Actors" 58. 
40  defenceWeb 2010 http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content 
&view=article&id=9204:SouthAfrica-to-strip-soldiers-abroad-of-
citizenship&catid=54:Governance&Itemid=118; Kader Asmal was a Professor of 
Constitutional Law. 
41  Manby Citizenship Law in Africa 78; LSSA 2010 http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-
west-1.amazonaws.com/docs/100817pchomelssa_0.pdf; Bosch, Maritz and Kimble 
"Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 58. 
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nationals serving in the armed forces of foreign states will not lose their 
South African citizenship – unless they acquired that citizenship by 
naturalisation. 
5  South African PSCs active abroad: has Executive 
Outcomes risen from the ashes? 
It is widely acknowledged that the South African PMS industry, which 
proliferated in post-apartheid South Africa, benefitted from the bush-war 
expertise of the personnel who had previously served under the SANDF's 
special operations units. When those units were disbanded under the new 
democratic dispensation, the market was flooded with highly trained and 
readily employable personnel. South African PMSCs such as Executive 
Outcomes found these conditions conducive to setting up shop and were 
able to respond quickly and decisively to calls for their services on the 
continent.  
Perhaps it was their success that made the new democratically elected ANC 
government wary of them – as a threat at domestic level, but also due to the 
way their activities in the region might undermine the ANC government's 
regional foreign policy and cause it political embarrassment.42 It was 
believed that the real intent behind the drafting of the FMA was to "de-
legitimise the industry".43 
Despite reports that the aim of the FMA was to close down PMSCs like 
Executive Outcomes (EO), Barlow44 (the founder of EO) claims that his 
company was in fact approached by the government and asked to comment 
on the draft FMA – which Barlow says they did. He remarks that many of 
their suggestions were in fact incorporated into the FMA. At the time EO 
was struggling to disassociate themselves from other PMSCs 
masquerading as EO. While there is no government confirmation of this 
little-known fact, Barlow maintains that EO was one of the first South African 
companies to be given a licence by the South African government to operate 
across Africa.  
Nevertheless, because of their public notoriety EO were forced to cease 
operating45 under that name after the introduction of the FMA. Other PMSCs 
                                            
42  Franklin 2008 Transnat'l L & Contemp Probs 252. 
43  Avant Market for Force 162, 167. 
44  Barlow "E-mail Response" – on file with author. 
45  Several Executive Outcomes' operatives moved across to Lifeguard and continued 
to work in Sierra Leone (O'Brien 2000 RUSI Journal 59; Bosch, Maritz and Kimble 
"Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 59). 
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which had kept a lower public profile46 quietly moved offshore, "charter 
shopping"47 for states where the domestic legislation was less draconian 
and where the vagaries of the NCACC were not likely to impact on them. 
Some resorted to operating more clandestinely – but still within the borders 
of South Africa.48 Those providing legal advice or lobbying government on 
their behalf have reported the lengths to which these PMSCs go to hide their 
identities and guard the details of their involvement in the industry.49 
Ironically, the hardline stance taken in the FMA, rather than affording the 
government the opportunity to regulate the industry, has resulted in the 
industry's going underground or off-shore and effectively circumventing any 
government regulation.50  
As for the individual South African PSCs, they may have been forced into 
early retirement from the SANDF when the armed forces were re-organised 
– but for many of them early retirement was not financially viable. With the 
FMA setting a hostile tone for the domestic PMSC industry, many PSCs 
resorted to seeking employment with foreign PMSCs51 and foreign 
militaries. Many PSCs relocated, like ex-EO operative Cobus Claassens, 
who heads up the Nigerian branch of the UK-based Pilgrims Group: a 
PMSC providing "security for multinationals and the British High 
Commission".52 
These "retired" South African PSCs were then, and still are, highly sought-
after, despite their advanced years. Speaking to the Royal Danish Defense 
College, Barlow53 quipped that:  
                                            
46  Including the PMSCs: Saracens, Security Control Systems and Lifeguard (Bosch, 
Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 60). 
47  Perrin Modern Warfare 228; Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate 
Actors" 60. 
48  Including, for example: Frederick, Nicholas and Duncan (FND); Avant Market for 
Force 161, 166; Holmqvist Private Security Companies 42. 
49  Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 60. 
50  Taljaard "Implementing South Africa's Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act" 
167, 169. 
51  Brooks 2000 International Peacekeeping 136; Taljaard "Implementing South Africa's 
Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act" 167, 169. 
52  Wallis and Manson 2015 https://www.ft.com/content/4cda876e-d2e8-11e4-a792-
00144feab7de; Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 60. 
53  Formerly head of EO, now chairman of Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment and 
Protection (STTEP). "Mercenaries from South Africa have proved quietly decisive in 
helping the Nigerian military turn around its campaign against Boko Haram, writes 
Colin Freeman in Abuja" (Freeman 2015 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world 
news/africaandindianocean/nigeria/11596210/South-African-mercenaries-secret-
war-on-Boko-Haram.html). 
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Yes, many of us are no longer 20-year-olds. But with our age has come a 
knowledge of conflicts and wars in Africa that our younger generation 
employees have yet to learn, and a steady hand when things get rough. 
Barlow openly discusses his mandate to teach the Nigerian Armed forces 
the tactics of "unconventional mobile warfare" in their war against Boko 
Haram.54 The Nigerian government insists that Barlow and his fellow South 
Africans are providing only technical advice and are not offering combat-
related services. Barlow counters that:  
… his men had been involved in direct combat, intelligence gathering, troop 
transportation and evacuation of casualties.55 
Furthermore, March 2015 media reports of a South African death in Nigeria, 
reportedly as a result of friendly fire, suggest that Barlow's version has some 
traction.56 Officially Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, South Africa's Minister of 
Defence, has threatened to prosecute any South African found to have been 
involved in conflict in Nigeria.57 To date, however, no charges have been 
laid against any South Africans deployed in Nigeria. Interestingly, Nigeria's 
ambassador to South Africa confirmed, in the third session of the South 
Africa-Nigeria Defence Committee sitting in Cape Town on 27 September 
2017, that Nigeria was thankful for the support it had received from South 
Africa in the form of military hardware58. This announcement comes on the 
back of speculation in the Nigerian Media during 2016 that South Africa was 
"joining the fight against Boko Haram".59 While the veracity of these claims 
is questioned,60 this does suggests that there will be very little political will 
to prosecute PSCs who may be assisting in the fight against Boko Haram, 
since the SANDF is resource strapped and unable to assist.  
                                            
54  Barlow date unknown http://eebenbarlowsmilitaryandsecurityblog.blogspot.co.za/. 
55  Barlow writes on his blog that his air power unit was "given kill blocks to the front and 
flanks of the strike force and could conduct missions in those areas" (Barlow date 
unknown http://eebenbarlowsmilitaryandsecurityblog.blogspot.co.za/). 
56  Smith 2015 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/14/south-africas-ageing-
white-mercenaries-who-helped-turn-tide-on-boko-haram; Bosch, Maritz and Kimble 
"Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 61. 
57  SAPA 2015 http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/arrest-sa-mercenaries-says-defence-
boss-1810571. "Fellow PSCs say that public opinion in SA, and the western world is 
on their side" (Wallis and Manson 2015 https://www.ft.com/content/4cda876e-d2e8-
11e4-a792-00144feab7de). 
58 Hyman 2017 http://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-09-28-sa-fought-boko-
haram. 
59  Allison 2016 https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-03-08-nigeria-is-south-
africa-really-joining-the-fight-against-boko-haram/#.WdzljtMjHUo. 
60  Defence ministry spokesman, Siphiwe Dlamini, claims "there is no such decision to 
send any military elements by the RSA to assist with the fight against Boko Haram" 
(Allison 2016 https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-03-08-nigeria-is-south-
africa-really-joining-the-fight-against-boko-haram/#.WdzljtMjHUo). 
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6  South Africans taking up arms for foreign causes like 
ISIS and the IDF: is the risk of prosecution under the FMA 
real?  
It is not uncommon to hear of South Africans of Jewish descent electing to 
serve in the Israeli Defence Force. In 2009 the Palestinian Solidarity 
Alliance, together with the Media Review Network, handed over to the NPA 
a list (the "Gaza Docket") of 73 South African citizens who were allegedly 
serving in the IDF during Operation Cast Lead61 in Gaza. Among the names 
listed is Dean Goodson, who has openly admitted to and promoted his 
involvement with the IDF. Tayob,62 a lawyer involved in compiling the Gaza 
Docket, argues that "in terms of the Foreign Military Assistance Act, (they) 
must be prosecuted". The official line from the Department of Defence, 
however, remains that: 
… the NCACC has not granted permission to any South African to participate 
in the current Gaza conflict. 
However, they concede that they are "aware that some may be serving in 
the IDF without clearance".63 Despite calls for the prosecution of South 
Africans serving in the Israeli military, there appears to be a reluctance to 
charge or prosecute those acting in violation of the FMA. The NPA declined 
to prosecute the 73 individuals named in the Gaza Docket – but that 
decision has been taken on review.64  
The involvement of South African citizens in the IDF has also attracted the 
attention of the Chief Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
In November 2009 Al-Jazeera reported that Luis Moreno-Ocampo was 
conducting an investigation into war crimes committed during Operation 
                                            
61  Operation Cast Lead took place from December 2008 to January 2009. 
62  Cottle 2015 http://www.vocfm.co.za/will-the-anc-govt-ever-prosecute-s-africans-
serving-in-the-idf/; Asmal 2014 http://mg.co.za/article/2014-08-07-gaza-conflict-for-
some-war-is-where-the-heart-is. 
63  Cottle 2015 http://www.vocfm.co.za/will-the-anc-govt-ever-prosecute-s-africans-
serving-in-the-idf/; Asmal 2014 http://mg.co.za/article/2014-08-07-gaza-conflict-for-
some-war-is-where-the-heart-is. 
64  Asmal 2014 http://mg.co.za/article/2014-08-07-gaza-conflict-for-some-war-is-
where-the-heart-is. 
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Cast Lead by a South African IDF officer, Lt Col David Benjamin.65 At the 
time, South Africa was still a signatory to the Rome Statute.66  
The IDF is not the only agency recruiting South Africans. Some sources 
claim that as many as 140 South Africans have been recruited by Islamic 
State in Syria (ISIS).67 Several infamous Islamist fighters have also been 
apprehended with South African passports – including al-Qaeda militant 
Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, the "White Widow" Samantha Lewthwaite, and 
Abu Hurayra al-Afriki. Iraq's ambassador to South Africa, Dr Hushaim al-
Alawi, has confirmed that at least 3 South African ISIS recruits have been 
killed in action, although their deaths were subsequently covered up as car 
accidents.68 If these reports are to be believed, then South Africans are fast 
becoming the most prolific recruiting ground for ISIS – for African fighters 
outside of North Africa.69  
Dube,70 spokesperson for the Department of State Security, said that the 
Department was unaware of any specific cases of South Africans fighting 
for the Islamic State – but said that his Department had received:  
… a number of reports of people claiming to be doing all kinds of work outside 
the borders of our country.  
He emphasised that under the FMA any kind of mercenary activity is illegal, 
and that the FMA explicitly prohibits South African citizens from taking up 
arms overseas.71 The additional legal angle in the cases involving South 
Africans taking up arms for ISIS is that these individuals can also face 
prosecution under the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against 
Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004, which prohibits "South 
African citizens from committing terrorist acts domestically and in foreign 
                                            
65  Cottle 2015 http://www.vocfm.co.za/will-the-anc-govt-ever-prosecute-s-africans-
serving-in-the-idf/. 
66  Cottle 2015 http://www.vocfm.co.za/will-the-anc-govt-ever-prosecute-s-africans-
serving-in-the-idf/; Anon 2016 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/21/ 
south-africa-to-quit-international-criminal-court-document-shows. 
67  Allison 2015 http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-02-22-exclusive-is-this-
the-first-south-african-fighting-for-the-isis/#.wbmtlpn94du. An Al Jazeera 
investigation in 2015 claims that at least 23 South Africans have joined Islamic State 
of Iraq and the Levant group (ISIL) (Corke 2015 http://ewn.co.za/2015/04/07/Online-
activity-alerted-authorities-on-Isis-bound-teen). 
68  Anon 2015 http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/South-Africans-return-home-
from-ISIS-held-territory-20150911. 
69  ISS 2015 https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/are-south-africans-soft-targets-for-isis-
recruitment 
70  ISS 2015 https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/are-south-africans-soft-targets-for-isis-
recruitment. 
71  ISS 2015 https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/are-south-africans-soft-targets-for-isis-
recruitment. 
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countries" – including "providing or offering to provide a skill, expertise, or 
training".72 In August 2016 the Johannesburg magistrate's court heard 
testimony from Renaldo Smith, who testified that he and the Thulsie twins 
were part of a group planning to leave South Africa to join ISIS.73 They were 
arrested and charged with three counts of contravening the Protection of 
Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act, 
before the case was moved to the High Court. They have been placed on 
the US terror watch list and are due to appear before the High Court again 
on the 20 October 2017.74 
Given the possibility that those with links to ISIS might have plans to target 
South African sites and not only fight abroad, they are more likely to face 
arrest and prosecution under the Protection of Constitutional Democracy 
against Terrorist and Related Activities Act, as appears to be the case with 
the Thulsie twins. The case of the Thulsie twins will be watched closely to 
assess whether those with ISIS and Boko Haram affiliations may find that 
they are targeted for prosecution despite the inefficiencies of the FMA. 
South Africans fighting for the IDF or involved in the PMS industry abroad 
(without the NCACC's authorisation) are unlikely attract the same degree of 
prosecutorial attention under the existing legislative regime, as set out in the 
FMA. If the NPA's track record is anything to go by, however, they will at 
worst face insignificant fines and will doubtless be offered a plea bargain. 
7  Conclusion 
The international community, including many prolific users and suppliers of 
personnel to the PMS industry,75 has focused its attention on regulating the 
                                            
72  ISS 2015 https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/are-south-africans-soft-targets-for-isis-
recruitment. 
73  Pretorius 2016 http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/police-were-exercising-
their-right-by-arresting-thulsie-twins-prosecutor-20160804. 
74  Anon 2017 https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/justice-safety/sas-thulsie-twins-
placed-on-us-terror-list-11281219. 
75  The United Kingdom regulates the industry according to FCO 2001-2002 HC 557 
and the FCO 2009 Consultation on Promoting High Standards of Conduct by PMSCs 
Internationally. The United States passed the Arms Export Control Act, 1976; 
Uniform Code of Military Justice US Code Title 10 Subtitle A Part II Chapter 47; 
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 2007; Public Law 106–523, US State 
Department Committee on Armed Services 2010 
https://fas.org/irp/congress/2010_rpt/sasc-psc.pdf (Bosch, Maritz and Kimble 
"Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 62). 
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industry76 through projects like the Montreux Document,77 the International 
Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICOC),78 the draft 
PMSC Convention,79and the most recent movement towards ISO 
accreditation (ISO 18788 and ISO 28007) for this industry,80 through a third-
party certification audit.81  
South Africa is one of only two states82 which have opted, instead, to 
regulate the participation of their nationals in the private security industry 
through the extra-territorial application of domestic legislation.83 South 
Africa is also the only national state that has drafted legislation aimed at 
regulating this industry, which perceives foreign military assistance with 
mercenary suspicion.84 Notably, the drafters of the PMSC Draft Convention, 
who initially had an anti-mercenary mandate,85 officially dispelled the 
misconception that PMSCs are necessarily mercenaries. The prosecutorial 
track record of the FMA and the fact that the PMA has failed to enter into 
force after nine years, coupled with the blatant disregard that PSCs have 
shown the NCACC, suggests that this approach has not rendered the 
desired results and "is neither practicable nor necessary".86 The historic lack 
of applications for authorisation to offer foreign military assistance has been 
linked to concerns around the broad and ambiguous discretionary powers 
given to the NCACC, and an inability to assess the potential success of 
one's application. Even those involved in the review of applications have 
                                            
76  Gomez del Prado 2008 http://www.law.wisc.edu/gls/documents/ 
gomez_del_prado_paper.doc; Walker and Whyte 2005 ICLQ 651, 660-661, 687; 
Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 62. 
77  ICRC 2009 https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf. 
78  ICOCA 2010 http://www.icoc-psp.org. To date, over 500 private military security 
companies have signed the ICoC (Crook 2013 AJIL 213). 
79  OHCHR Draft Convention on Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) 
A/HRC/15/25 (2010); Gabor 2013 http://newsarchive.ohchr.org/EN/News 
Events/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14105&LangID=E; Gumedze 2009 
http://www.issafrica.org/publications/papers/addressing-the-use-of-private-security-
and-military-companies-at-the-international-level; OHCHR 2013 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13154&
LangID=E. 
80  ISO 2015 http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_ 
detail.htm?csnumber=63380. 
81  DeWinter-Schmitt 2014 http://psm.du.edu/commentary/index.html; Bosch, Maritz 
and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 64. 
82  The other being India. 
83  Avant Market for Force 162, 163; Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or 
Legitimate Actors" 62. 
84  Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 65. 
85  Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 63. 
86  HRC Annual Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of 
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-
Determination A/HRC/15/25 (2010) para 7. 
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admitted that there was a degree of uncertainty surrounding how they were 
to interpret the provisions of the FMA.87 With the concern that an application 
could be unfairly denied (in terms of section 9) or withdrawn at a later stage 
(in terms of sections 4(3) and 5(3)), those in the industry have elected to 
continue conducting business as usual without NCACC authorisation. They 
have taken this risk in the knowledge that the potential for prosecution will 
be minimal, and they will have a good basis to challenge any prosecution 
on administrative or constitutional law grounds.88 
PMSCs and PSCs will probably be a permanent feature in all "humanitarian, 
peacekeeping, and peace-enforcement operations".89 This is a reality that 
the South African government has conceded since 2012 in their South 
African Defence Review:90  
PSCs with links to South Africa will continue to feature in defence 
transformation, peacekeeping and peace building in conflict and post-
conflict91 for the foreseeable future.92  
In the 2012 South African Defence Review, the government acknowledged 
that South African Private security contractors continue to provide essential 
services and that they have a force-multiplying effect, but that the issue 
"remains the effective regulation of South African private security 
companies"93 since "it became apparent that this legislation (the FMA) 
lacked adequate substance".94 In the 2015 South African Defence Review 
the government made the point that mercenarism is not to be confused with 
"the legal activities of private security companies".95 Since 2014 the official 
position in the annual South African Defence Review has repeatedly, and 
at times word-for-word, indicated a new willingness to loosen the 
                                            
87  Avant Market for Force 162; Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate 
Actors" 59. 
88  Two South African PMSCs – Meteoric Tactical Solutions and Erinys – both providing 
protection services in Iraq, were deployed without NCACC authorisation. However, 
no legal action was taken against either company or their South African employees 
(Schreier and Caparini 2005 https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/ 
documents/op06_privatising-security.pdf 107-108). 
89        Singer 2006 BJWA 108. 
90  DOD 2012 http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/defence%20review_daft.pdf  
ch 3 para 48. 
91  DOD 2012 http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/defence%20review_daft.pdf ch 
3 para 48. 
92  Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 65. 
93  DOD 2012 http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/defence%20review_daft.pdf ch 
3 para 48; Bosch, Maritz and Kimble "Mercenaries or Legitimate Actors" 65. 
94  DOD 2012 http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/defence%20review_daft.pdf ch 
3 para 49. 
95  DOD 2015 http://www.dod.mil.za/documents/defencereview/Defence% 
20Review%202015.pdf. 
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government's prior hardcore regulatory stranglehold on the PMSC industry. 
Could we be seeing a new era for the regulation of the PMS industry in 
South Africa, and could this explain why the PMA appears to have been 
shelved? 
While this might be the light at the end of the tunnel for the ex-EO operatives 
who continue to share their expertise across the continent, those joining the 
ranks of ISIS would be wise to heed the caution of the Department of State 
Security. Those signing up to the IDF appear to occupy a middle ground, 
and their fate rests in the success or otherwise of appeals by groups like the 
Palestinian Solidarity Alliance to force the NPA to apply the FMA in these 
cases. 
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